Southeast Asia’s small navies face a quantum shift – East Asia Forum
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London School of Economics and Political Science
Quantum technologies are emerging as a new factor in maritime security, with implications for encryption, navigation and submarine detection. Southeast Asia’s small navies, already vulnerable to signal interception and electronic interference, must prepare for a future in which undersea infrastructure and communications networks face quantum-enabled threats. Rather than pursuing costly platforms, states can strengthen resilience through selective technological development, electronic warfare capabilities and multilateral cooperation, turning quantum disruption into an opportunity for collective security.
Southeast Asia’s small and ‘smaller small’ navies operate in an increasingly complex strategic environment where busy sea lanes intersect with increasing competition over dual-use emerging technologies. Quantum technologies are not yet superweapons, despite the national security ‘hype’ surrounding them, but they may over time shift operational advantages. Anticipating these changes will help the region’s small navies reduce strategic vulnerability.
The adoption of quantum technologies represents an immediate concern for information security. A large, fault-tolerant quantum computer could undermine widely used encryption systems, placing maritime command and control, port systems and private communications at risk. Resilience guidelines for maritime supply chains increasingly emphasise the need for states to stress-test current encryption methods against quantum computing threats.
Naval positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) systems are also undergoing a ‘revolution’. Technologies like quantum clocks and quantum inertial sensors promise positioning systems that do not rely on GPS, which is increasingly vulnerable to jamming. Philippine resupply missions to the grounded BRP Sierra Madre regularly report communications jamming from the Chinese navy.
The operational payoff goes beyond positional accuracy. A fleet that retains assured PNT in contested conditions can gain a ‘first-mover operational advantage’ by making decisions, manoeuvring, targeting faster and delivering precision fires more reliably than an adversary operating with degraded information.
Beneath the water’s surface, advances in quantum sensing — particularly magnetometers and gravimeters — may improve the detection of submarines. These tools will not render submarines obsolete, but they may reduce the survivability margins of those operated by small navies. With submarines from Southeast Asia’s small navies already finding it hard to avoid the interception of their communications signals, boat crews will need to exploit noise and clutter to avoid detection rather than relying on deception techniques alone.
None of these developments necessarily mean the end of maritime territorial sovereignty for Southeast Asia’s small states. Small states have not been passive spectators to the massive investments in quantum security, with many national initiatives already underway. Yet several practical policies can still be adopted to preserve sovereignty — and to prevent its erosion by quantum technologies.
Given their lack of resources, small navies need to treat the adoption of quantum technologies as a ‘readiness agenda’ rather than a procurement fantasy. This will require deferring the acquisition of traditional status enhancement assets and marginal fleet upgrades — which do little to enhance a fleet’s resilience against quantum technologies. The effectiveness of fleets in Southeast Asia will depend less on possessing a sufficient number of diesel-propelled submarines and more on whether each can fight in the new technological environment.
Thailand offers a useful example of how smaller navies can approach quantum readiness. The country’s early investments in comparative strengths — such as information technology, mathematics and specialised scientific expertise — will pay off more than directly pursuing technological transformation. In accordance with Thailand’s Quantum Technology Roadmap 2020–29, its small navy established an electronic warfare division to buttress the efforts of the Naval Communication and Information Technology Department, which is guided by a classified doctrine that prioritises selective technology development over broad procurements.
Across Southeast Asia, small navies have securitised the seabed. Yet these efforts have rarely accounted for quantum-related risks. The so-called ‘comprehensive’ approach to securing seabed assets, including undersea cables, is incomplete unless it secures against quantum threats. When considering maritime security, Southeast Asia’s small navies must treat the undersea network as an integrated ecosystem — if any part of the chain continues to rely on legacy cryptography, the entire system remains vulnerable.
Existing ‘use of force’ clauses in international maritime law offer limited protection against quantum-based interference with seabed infrastructure — especially since legal frameworks have not evolved to adequately address cyberattacks. For small navies, protecting critical seabed assets will increasingly depend on deterrence, the credibility of which relies on quantum sensing. Even the residual logic of a ‘fleet-in-being’ — deterrence through latent capability — becomes harder to sustain in the seabed domain without quantum-enabled sensing and attribution. The Royal Thai Navy appears to recognise that relatively modest adjustments to its deterrence models in the seabed domain can offer large benefits.
As efforts grow to rethink sea power beyond imperial models rooted in dominance and exploitation — and shape more cooperative and sustainable maritime practices — Southeast Asia’s small navies must build a regional ‘quantum maritime commons’. Quantum issues have received little sustained attention in maritime diplomacy. A useful precedent can be found in the decision by smaller members of NATO to establish a ‘quantum-ready alliance’.
For Southeast Asia’s small navies, the most realistic path is to move beyond the region’s default reliance on bilateral or minilateral agreements and instead strengthen cooperation at the multilateral level through the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting.
In practice, this would involve shared standards, joint training and pooled expertise that enable genuine ‘quantum resistance’ without requiring each navy to build an end-to-end quantum industrial base. Such cooperation offers the fastest and most cost-effective way to turn quantum technologies from a looming dependency risk into a durable form of security. To this end, explicit language on the undersea domain and quantum technologies must be added to the ASEAN Maritime Outlook 2023.
The adoption of quantum technologies by major naval powers will widen maritime capability gaps. At the same time, it will create catch-up pathways for Southeast Asia’s small navies that pursue the right niche capabilities and cooperative measures.
Hadrien T Saperstein holds a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research interests include maritime strategic thought, international relations theory and small states in Southeast Asia.
EAF | Southeast Asia | Southeast Asia’s small navies face a quantum shift
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